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In recent years, corporate governance scholars have 
focused their attention on the study of the 
characteristics that the board must have to 
guarantee control over the work of management and 
to support the decision-making process. The 
composition of the board of directors (BoD), in 
terms of gender, age, nationality and 
professionalism of the members is a crucial 
determinant for the economic performance of the 
companies. Though there is a vast number of studies 
dedicated to assessing the impact of women’s 
presence in BoD on firm performance; the findings 
are often contradictory. 
Over the past decades, women have played 
more and more important roles in the workplace. 
The proportion of women directors also increases 
steadily around the world. Previously considered 
a social and of image issue, gender diversity was 
increasingly approached as a value-driver in 
organisational strategy and corporate governance. 
Arguments in support of management diversity are 
that a more diverse board of directors may take 
decisions while considering a wider range of 
alternatives, may generate a better public image of 
the firm and improve firm performance as well. In 
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In recent years, many countries have adopted different legislative 
and self-regulatory initiatives to be able to tackle the problem of 
the underrepresentation of women on boards. Also, Italy with Law 
No. 120/2011 introduced the gender issue adopting the normative 
that 1/3 of the elected members would be women. In this job, 
a primary aim was to study over the period 2016/2018 the impact 
of female presence on boards of 50 companies listed on the Italian 
Stock Exchange. In depth, our results confirm that Italian Law has 
produced significant effects on the composition of the corporate 
board. The result of our study shows that women positively 
influence corporate performance, this is perfectly in line with the 
literature on gender diversity. The contribution of the work is that 
the empirical study conducted on the 50 companies listed on the 
Milan Stock Exchange allows confirming what has been claimed in 
the literature and that is the importance of the female presence on 
the boards. An immediate reading of the data allows us to confirm 
that the female presence in corporate governance has a positive 
impact on corporate performance and productivity. 
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article addresses the question of whether board 
gender diversity indeed has a significant positive 
effect on firm performance using data for 50 listed 
firms observed in 2016-2017 and 2018, listed on the 
Italian Stock Exchange. Were selected the 25 top 
revenues and the 25 lowest revenues. Banks, 
insurance companies, and football clubs have been 
excluded as a result of their specific accounting, 
which poses difficulties for the calculation of the 
performance measure. The study, conducted 
through an empirical analysis of the 50 companies 
in the sample, after a review of the literature on the 
subject, intends to answer the following research 
question: does the female presence in corporate 
governance affect the results of corporate 
performance? Based on the data collected, the work 
primarily provides an answer to the research 
question and, subsequently, highlights both the 
limits that emerge from the analysis carried out and 
any future research prospects. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: after 
an introductory section, Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature, Section 3 analyses the research 
methodology (aimed at describing the empirical 
research conducted), Section 4 is devoted to the 
discussion of search results. Finally, Section 5 
reports the conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In Italian companies the percentage of women in 
leadership positions is still low, reducing the gap is 
a desired goal for company growth. A female leader 
is often more suited to the role than a male leader, 
especially thanks to the typically female ability to 
quickly reach the set goals (Brieger, Francoeur, 
Welzel, & Ben-Amar, 2019). Statistical data (Istat, 
2017) show that women with top positions often 
have an above average preparation. 
Women bring a greater diversity of opinions 
than men, improve the image of the company, 
influence the decision-making process and the 
leadership styles of the organization (Huse & 
Solberg, 2006). They are mainly characterized by 
dynamic values and attitudes (Gabaldon, De Anca, & 
Mateos de Cabo, 2016; Rizotti & Frisenna, 2017); for 
the ability to deal with complexity and the new, 
ethics in work, the ability to learn and simplify, the 
ability to find solutions and share them with others. 
Women are capable of adapting to changes, of 
interacting with both the internal and external 
environment, of managing and solving problems 
related to the organization, however, they are less 
inclined to risk, but are in favor of sharing decisions 
and power (McKinsey & Company, 2008; Bart & 
McQueen, 2013). Female leadership can: 
 improve corporate governance and the 
functioning of collegiate bodies (Sheridan, 
Ross-Smith, & Lord ,2014); 
 influence the results related to the 
organization and ensure better results in terms of 
employee productivity and innovation 
(Melero, 2011); 
 trigger the virtuous circle of a more objective 
ex-ante selection (for merit and skills) and ex-post 
(for contribution and performance), in which all 
female and male talents and skills have the same 
opportunity to emerge receive also the same 
evaluation and remuneration (Doldor, Sealy, & 
Vinnicombe, 2016). 
Following the entry into force of the law since 
2012, most companies have organized themselves to 
grow career opportunities for women with high 
leadership skills. The entry of the administrators has 
contributed to reducing the average age of the 
members of the boards of directors (Cerved, 2018) 
has gone from an average age of about 60 years to 
52/53 years. Furthermore, the presence of women 
on the board of directors has positively affected the 
company's profitability (Torchia, Calabrò, Huse, & 
Brogi, 2010). Increasing the number of female 
managers means positively improving creativity, 
innovation (Peterson & Philpot 2007; Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). 
Several empirical studies demonstrate the 
existence of positive effects of gender diversity on 
the adoption of good governance practices (Brown, 
Brown, & Anastasopoulos, 2002; Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010). In the 
past, research has been conducted to verify the 
impact of female leadership on corporate 
performance. There is a general consensus in 
admitting that the presence of women on the boards 
of directors improves corporate governance 
practices (Dhir, 2015; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; 
Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Examining the economic 
performance of large U.S. companies Kim and Starks 
(2016) found that a greater gender balance among 
board members is associated with greater 
profitability. Other research on U.S. companies 
indicates that the companies included in 
Fortune 500 with a higher percentage of women, 
certainly perform better than companies with 
a lower percentage of women (Wagner, 2011). It was 
also found in both Latin America (McKinsey & 
Company, 2013) and in Spain (Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera, 2008) that the diversified boards of 
directors contribute positively to the performance of 
the companies. Regarding the diversification within 
the board of directors, some authors claim that 
there is a positive impact, others that there is 
a neutral effect, and others even that there is 
a negative effect. 
Among those who consider a non-statistically 
significant impact of the female presence on the 
profitability of companies and on market value are 
the studies of Randøy, Thomsen, and Oxelheim 
(2006), who examined companies from Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden in 2005; Rose's studies (Rose, 
2007), who focused attention on a sample of Danish 
companies for the period 1998-2001; the studies of 
Marinova, Platenga, and Remery (2010), who 
achieved this result by analyzing 186 German and 
Danish companies in 2007; those of Gregory-Smith, 
Main, and O’Reilly III (2014), who arrive at the same 
result through the analysis of UK data. Dobbin and 
Jung (2011) argue that there is no relationship 
between the presence of female directors on the 
boards and performance results. Other studies show 
a negative relationship between the percentage of 
women on boards of directors and company 
performance. Among these studies we mention 
those of Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997); Van der 
Walt and Ingley (2003); Francoeur, Labelle, and 
Sinclair-Desgagné (2008); Mirza, Andleeb, and 
Ramzan (2012); Wellalage and Locke (2013). 
On the contrary, the second strand of scholars 
expresses a positive opinion on the impact of 
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women on company performance. Specifically, with 
reference to Spain, Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008) show that the value of the company is 
positively correlated to the degree of diversification 
of the members on the boards, it is shown that 
companies with a greater presence of women have 
a better functioning of the board of directors and 
allow a greater ability to know the needs of the 
various stakeholders. It is believed that women 
taking on the role of administrators manage to solve 
problems in a non-traditional way, following 
different points of view than men. The companies 
that have activated the policies for which women 
have also reached prestigious positions have 
benefits from the point of view of profitability 
(Casarico, Profeta, & Salvadori, 2009; Mirza et al., 
2012, Wellalage & Locke, 2013). Women bring 
diversified and complementary skills and knowledge 
compared to men's (Huse & Solberg, 2006); they are 
characterized by the ability to face, learn and 
simplify, find solutions and share them with others 
(Brieger et al., 2019). Not exploiting the skills of 
highly qualified women is a waste of talent and 
a potential loss of economic growth (Grosvold & 
Brammer, 2011). 
At the same time, there are other studies 
(Roberson & Park 2007) which actually show how the 
diversity of interests represented on the boards of 
directors entails a greater risk of conflicts and 
clashes within the group, thus reducing the 
performance of the boards (Rose, Munch-Madsen, & 
Funch, 2013; Lincoln & Adedoyin, 2012). Tacheva 
and Huse (2006) say that having women on the 
board of directors involves longer meetings, which 
can generate conflict and adversely affect company 
results (Stahl, Maznevski, Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010). 
Mahadeo Soobaroyen, and Hanuman (2012) in the 
studies show that stakeholders perceive and 
positively evaluate the female presence and connect 
it to better corporate performance (Wellalage & 
Locke, 2013). Some authors, on the other hand, note 
that the presence of women on the boards also has 
a reputational effect (Miller & Triana, 2009; Huse, 
Hoskisson, Zattoni, & Viganò, 2011) since by 
attracting the attention of the media companies are 
more attentive to their image and seek in all ways to 
improve it (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; 
Fernandez-Fejoo, Romero, & Ruiz, 2012). Others 
(Bourez, 2005; Konrad & Kramer, 2006) argue that in 
many cases the presence of women is mostly 
symbolic, as the increase in the female gender is 
often a strategic decision taken by the company to 
obtain the support of the stakeholders who 
otherwise it would fail (Hillman et al., 2007; Huse & 
Solberg, 2006). In a study carried out by Cook and 
Glass (2014), it is highlighted how many companies 
resort to female managers who demonstrate greater 
resistance to stress to cope with the crisis. 
Investing in gender diversity within the 
company is important both to comply with the laws 
and not incur penalties, and because much diversity 
is the best solution for doing business 
(Grant Thornton, 2019). Diversity is a value for the 
company, only from different ideas are creativity, 
innovation and results generated. Better 
performance can be achieved from a heterogeneous 
environment. 
 
2.1. State of art gender diversity in Europa 
 
In recent years, several European countries, starting 
from the hypothesis that a greater presence of 
women has positive effects on performance, have 
adopted legislative and self-regulation initiatives to 
be able to solve the problem of female 
under-representation in corporate BoD. In 
November 2012, the European Commission set the 
share on gender equality at 40%; to date, however, 
despite the success, the overall scenario is always 
the preserve of men. Furthermore, not all nations 
have specific laws on gender quotas and, even where 
these are present, it is not said that they have 
reached high levels. 
Norway was the first country to adopt the pink 
quota mechanism and with the “Public Limited 
Companies Act” approved in 2003 it imposed on the 
listed companies the achievement of a pink quota 
variable according to the number of directors, to be 
achieved within three years. At the end of 2005, the 
percentage was around 17%. To solve the problem, 
Norway has introduced severe sanctions as a result 
of which, already in 2009, the percentage was 
around the predetermined one (European 
PWN, 2010). 
Spain with Law No. 3 of 22/03/07, supported 
the effective equality between men and women by 
providing economic incentives in favor of public and 
private companies with at least 50 employees who 
by 2015 on the boards of directors had a percentage 
equal to at least 40% of both genres. No sanctions 
were foreseen for failure to apply the rules. 
In Belgium, a federal law adopted in 2011 
established a minimum percentage of 33% of both 
genders in the BoD of public companies to be 
implemented by 2016. 
In January 2011, France adopted 
Law 103/2011, relating to the "balanced 
representation of women and men in BoD and 
surveillance and professional equality". All 
companies with more than 500 employees or with 
revenues greater than € 5 million had to have a 40% 
share of women to be reached within six years, 
i.e., by 2017, but with a minimum achievement of 
20% within the first three years of the promulgation 
of the law. In the event of non-compliance with the 
quotas, the sanction provided was the nullity of the 
BoD members’ appointments and the suspension of 
the directors’ remuneration. 
Germany was the last country to approve the 
quota law and from 2016 the German companies 
listed on the stock exchange had to reserve 30% of 
the seats in the BoD for women. No penalties were 
provided for as the companies could independently 
determine the composition of their top 
management, accepting the spirit of the law without 
departing from the indicated commitments. 
In Italy, until 2011 the percentage of women on 
the board stood at around 6.8%. Following the 
requests of the European Union, and thanks to the 
issue of Law No 120/2011, defined as the 
Golfo-Mosca Law, since August 2012, the companies 
listed on the stock exchange, and from 
February 2013 the publicly controlled companies, 
have had the obligation to provide in the provisions 
of its statutes to ensure the gender balance in the 
administrative bodies, to be applied to the first 
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renewal of these bodies and after three consecutive 
mandates. In particular, the law established that the 
division of the directors to be elected had to be 
made on the basis of a criterion capable of ensuring 
the balance between genders since the least 
represented gender had to obtain at least a third of 
the elected directors. For the defaulting companies, 
a notice of Consob was envisaged in the first 
instance, then a sanction and finally in the presence 
of further defaults the forfeiture of the elected 
members. This is a temporary rule, the corporate 
bodies that are renewed for the first time after the 
law in 2014 will remain in office until 2023. The 
purpose of the rule is to be able to carry out positive 
actions for the time deemed sufficient to guarantee 
a cultural change. To date, despite participation in 
BoD in Europe has increased significantly, however, 
women continue to be less represented than men. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Sample 
 
Our sample comprises 50 listed companies of Milan 
Stoke Exchange in the years 2016-2017-2018: 25 
with the highest and 25 with the lowest revenues. 
Financial institutions and football clubs have been 
excluded as a result of their specific accounting 
policy. Specifically, the football clubs have not been 
analyzed as only three are listed on the Milan Stock 
Exchange and do not fall within the predetermined 
range (Table 1). The main data source regarding 
board characteristics were companies’ annual 
reports and the relation of corporate governance. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample 
 
 1st subsample name Revenue at 31/12/2017 
 
 2nd subsample name Revenue at 31/12/2017 
1 Eni 76.938.000.000 1 Gas Plus 88.590.000 
2 Enel 75.672.000.000 2 Zucchi 83.020.000 
3 Telecom 19.281.000.000 3 Ambienthesis 82.080.000 
4 Leonardo 12.939.000.000 4 Biancamano 80.850.000 
5 Saras 10.396.910.000 5 Enervit 63.130.000 
6 Prysmian 10.244.000.000 6 I Grandi Viaggi 63.030.000 
7 Edison 9.313.000.000 7 Fidia 59.740.000 
8 Saipem 8.526.000.000 8 Alerion 59.010.000 
9 Atlantia 6.916.000.000 9 B&C Speakers 55.140.000 
10 Hera 6.626.400.000 10 Caleffi 51.080.000 
11 A2a 6.494.000.000 11 Poligrafica S. Faustino 48.340.000 
12 Fincantieri 5.474.020.000 12 Bioera 41.380.000 
13 Autogrill 5.223.910.000 13 Txt 39.960.000 
14 Iren 4.040.770.000 14 Rosss 34.110.000 
15 Maire Tecnimont 3.646.610.000 15 It way 33.060.000 
16 Esprimet 3.571.190.000 16 Molmed 29.880.000 
17 Mediaset 3.401.500.000 17 Netweek 27.810.000 
18 Astaldi 3.060.000.000 18 Terni Energia 24.510.000 
19 Acea 3.028.490.000 19 Chl 23.280.000 
20 Buzzi Unicem 2.955.610.000 20 Mondo Tv 19.500.000 
21 Cir 2.857.730.000 21 Fullsix 9.500.000 
22 Cofide 2.857.670.000 22 Acotel 7.660.000 
23 Danieli&C 2.705.600.000 23 Eeems 1.000.000 
24 Snam 2.586.000.000 24 Titanmet 810.000 
25 De Longhi 2.078.130.000 25 Cose Belle d’Italia 590.000 
Source: Binder (2017). 
 
3.2. Analysis methodology 
 
The data were collected using the information from 
the annual reports of corporate governance and 
from financial websites for the years mentioned. 
Then attention was paid to the variables referring to 
women and these variables were compared with ROE 
(return on equity). There are several ways of 
measuring firm performance and there is hardly any 
agreement on which is the most efficient one. The 
indicator used is ROE. Specially, ROE is a measure 
that shows to an investor how much profit 
a company generates from the money invested by its 
shareholders (Fooladi, 2012), the most popular 
financial measure was used. 
The variables that have been collected are 
indicated below: 
 number of women in the BoD (WOMEN); 
 number of women in the role of 
president (WP); 
 number of women in the role of executive 
director (WED); 
 number of women with non-executive 
director roles (WNED); 
 number of women with non-executive and 
independent director roles (WNEID); 
 number of foreign women (WFOREIGN). 
Below, Table 2 and Table 3, show the complete 
dataset of the variables collected and used for the 
analysis. The data refer to the three-year period of 
reference, for the entire sample. 
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Table 2. Variable datasets referring to the entire sample (Part 1) 
 
Company Year WOMEN WP WED WNED WNEID ROE 
Enel 2016 3 1 0 8 8 7.22 
Enel 2017 3 1 0 8 8 10.22 
Enel 2018 3 1 0 0 2 13.27 
Eni 2016 3 1 0 0 1 -2.74 
Eni 2017 3 1 0 0 1 7.02 
Eni 2018 3 1 0 0 3 8.1 
Telecom 2016 6 0 0 1 1 8.35 
Telecom 2017 6 0 0 1 1 5.41 
Telecom 2018 6 0 0 0 6 -5.3 
Leonardo 2016 4 0 0 0 4 11.59 
Leonardo 2017 4 0 0 0 4 6.11 
Leonardo 2018 4 0 0 0 4 11.31 
Edison 2016 5 0 0 5 1 -2.63 
Edison 2017 3 0 0 3 3 1.09 
Edison 2018 5 0 0 3 2 1.09 
Saipem 2016 3 0 0 1 1 -42.58 
Saipem 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -6.68 
Saipem 2018 3 0 0 1 2 -26 
Saras 2016 3 0 0 0 1 21.28 
Saras 2017 3 0 0 0 1 22.46 
Saras 2018 4 0 0 0 4 12.72 
Prysmian 2016 3 0 0 1 1 15.64 
Prysmian 2017 3 0 0 1 1 13.31 
Prysmian 2018 4 0 0 0 4 2.44 
Hera 2016 3 0 0 1 1 8.6 
Hera 2017 5 0 0 1 1 9.86 
Hera 2018 4 0 0 0 4 10.42 
Atlantia 2016 6 0 0 1 1 12.17 
Atlantia 2017 6 0 0 1 1 6.63 
Atlantia 2018 5 0 0 2 3 6.63 
A2a 2016 4 0 0 1 1 7.31 
A2a 2017 4 0 0 1 1 9.92 
A2a 2018 4 1 0 0 4 10.05 
Autogrill 2016 2 0 0 1 1 16.66 
Autogrill 2017 4 0 0 1 1 16.26 
Autogrill 2018 5 0 0 1 4 11.67 
Fincantieri 2016 3 0 0 0 3 1.11 
Fincantieri 2017 3 0 0 0 3 4.06 
Fincantieri 2018 3 0 0 0 3 5.52 
Iren 2016 6 0 0 1 1 8.1 
Iren 2017 6 0 0 1 1 10.6 
Iren 2018 6 0 0 1 5 10.66 
Mediaset 2016 4 0 0 1 1 -8.93 
Mediaset 2017 4 0 0 1 1 8.98 
Mediaset 2018 5 0 1 1 3 19.88 
Maire Tecnimont 2016 4 0 0 0 1 46.19 
Maire Tecnimont 2017 4 0 0 0 1 44.6 
Maire Tecnimont 2018 4 0 0 0 4 34.26 
Esprinet 2016 3 0 0 0 1 8.45 
Esprinet 2017 4 0 0 0 1 7.77 
Esprinet 2018 5 0 0 0 5 4.13 
Astaldi 2016 3 0 0 1 1 10.4 
Astaldi 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -17.79 
Astaldi 2018 3 0 0 0 3 24.46 
Buzzi Unicem 2016 3 0 0 1 1 5.3 
Buzzi Unicem 2017 4 0 0 1 1 13.83 
Buzzi Unicem 2018 4 0 0 0 4 12.18 
Cir 2016 3 1 1 1 0 -2.93 
Cir 2017 4 1 1 1 0 -0.83 
Cir 2018 4 0 1 0 3 1.4 
Cofide 2016 3 0 0 1 1 4.01 
Cofide 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -2.93 
Cofide 2018 3 0 0 0 3 1.22 
Acea 2016 3 0 1 1 1 10.61 
Acea 2017 4 0 0 1 1 14.96 
Acea 2018 3 1 0 0 1 14.96 
Snam 2016 3 0 0 0 1 13.25 
Snam 2017 4 0 0 0 1 14.5 
Snam 2018 4 0 0 0 4 16.04 
Danieli & C 2016 3 0 1 0 1 4.95 
Danieli & C 2017 3 0 1 1 1 2.76 
Danieli & C 2018 3 0 1 1 1 3.13 
De Longhi 2016 4 0 1 1 1 16.59 
De Longhi 2017 4 0 1 1 1 17.59 
De Longhi 2018 4 0 1 0 3 17.33 
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Table 2. Variable datasets referring to the entire sample (Part 2) 
 
Company Year WOMEN WP WED WNED WNEID ROE 
Ambienthesis 2016 3 0 0 1 1 -3.75 
Ambienthesis 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -6.3 
Ambienthesis 2018 3 0 0 1 2 7.16 
Alerion 2016 2 0 0 1 1 0.72 
Alerion 2017 3 0 0 1 1 4.26 
Alerion 2018 3 0 0 0 3 2.38 
Poligrafica San Faustino 2016 5 0 0 1 0 2.41 
Poligrafica San Faustino 2017 5 0 0 1 0 11.13 
Poligrafica San Faustino 2018 5 0 0 5 0 5.22 
Caleffi S.p.a. 2016 2 1 1 0 0 3.18 
Caleffi S.p.a. 2017 3 1 1 1 1 -0.08 
Caleffi S.p.a. 2018 3 1 3 0 0 -6.04 
Bioera 2016 1 1 1 0 0 -25.44 
Bioera 2017 2 1 1 1 0 -140.59 
Bioera 2018 2 1 0 1 0 -150.7 
Fidia 2016 2 0 0 1 1 12.91 
Fidia 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -23.26 
Fidia 2018 3 0 0 0 3 -12.98 
B&C Speakers 2016 3 0 0 0 1 27.96 
B&C Speakers 2017 3 0 0 1 1 34.97 
B&C Speakers 2018 3 0 0 0 3 41.07 
Txt 2016 2 0 0 1 1 16.2 
Txt 2017 2 0 0 1 1 68.63 
Txt 2018 3 0 0 0 3 0.66 
Mondo Tv 2016 2 0 0 1 1 14.76 
Mondo Tv 2017 2 0 0 1 1 15.82 
Mondo Tv 2018 2 0 0 1 0 -75.75 
Rosss 2016 2 0 0 0 1 -18.28 
Rosss 2017 2 0 0 1 1 27.49 
Rosss 2018 2 0 0 0 2 -14.1 
It way 2016 1 0 0 1 1 -0.7 
It way 2017 1 0 0 1 1 7.88 
It way 2018 2 0 0 0 2 5.69 
Molmed 2016 4 0 0 1 1 -62.65 
Molmed 2017 4 0 0 1 1 -34.49 
Molmed 2018 4 0 0 1 3 -17.47 
Netweek 2016 3 0 0 1 1 598.22 
Netweek 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -48.45 
Netweek 2018 3 0 0 1 2 318.54 
Chl 2016 3 0 0 1 1 -41.6 
Chl 2017 4 0 1 1 1 -25.67 
Chl 2018 1 0 0 1 0 -88 
Fullsix 2016 2 0 0 1 1 -5.03 
Fullsix 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -35.43 
Fullsix 2018 2 0 0 1 1 -117.68 
Acotel 2016 1 0 1 0 0 -50.07 
Acotel 2017 1 0 1 0 0 -233.3 
Acotel 2018 2 0 1 0 1 -3395.93 
Titanmet 2016 2 0 0 0 0 198.8 
Titanmet 2017 2 0 1 0 0 216.67 
Titanmet 2018 3 0 0 1 2 -34.06 
Cose Belle d'Italia 2016 3 0 0 1 1 91.89 
Cose Belle d'Italia 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -21.75 
Cose Belle d'Italia 2018 3 0 0 1 2 -55.65 
Enervit 2016 2 0 1 1 0 11.81 
Enervit 2017 3 0 1 1 1 13.64 
Enervit 2018 3 0 1 1 1 13.64 
Terni Energia 2016 3 0 1 1 0 2 
Terni Energia 2017 2 0 1 1 0 -188.07 
Terni Energia 2018 3 0 1 1 1 -87.94 
I Grandi Viaggi 2016 3 0 1 1 1 1.44 
I Grandi Viaggi 2017 3 0 1 1 1 0.68 
I Grandi Viaggi 2018 3 0 1 0 2 1.86 
Biancamano 2016 2 0 0 1 1 17.11 
Biancamano 2017 2 0 0 1 1 4.82 
Biancamano 2018 2 0 0 0 2 4.82 
Zucchi 2016 3 0 0 1 1 -17.68 
Zucchi 2017 3 0 0 1 1 -16.34 
Zucchi 2018 2 0 0 0 2 -24.83 
Gas Plus 2016 3 0 0 1 1 -1.97 
Gas Plus 2017 3 0 0 3 2 0.36 
Gas Plus 2018 3 0 0 1 2 -0.87 
Eems 2016 2 0 0 1 1 300.9 
Eems 2017 1 1 1 0 0 -173.69 
Eems 2018 0 0 0 0 0 -21.46 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 3. Variable datasets collected for the entire change with reference to foreign women 
 
Company Year WFOREIGN ROE 
Telecom 2016 2 8.35 
Telecom 2017 1 5.41 
Telecom 2018 0 -5.3 
Edison 2016 4 -2.63 
Edison 2017 4 1.09 
Edison 2018 4 1.09 
Atlantia 2016 1 12.17 
Atlantia 2017 2 6.63 
Atlantia 2018 1 6.63 
Autogrill 2016 2 16.66 
Autogrill 2017 1 16.26 
Autogrill 2018 1 11.67 
Molmed 2016 1 -62.65 
Molmed 2017 1 -34.49 
Molmed 2018 1 -17.47 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
For each of the companies in the sample during the 
three-year period (Figure 1) there was a change in 
the number of women within the BoD.
 
Figure 1. Number of women 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
4. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In our analysis, we have identified the number of 
women who are present on the board of directors 
and the role they play within the board, with the aim 
of verifying whether the women, during the 
three-year period examined, managed to break the 
prejudices and to conquer positions of prestige, 
which before the implementation of the Golfo-Mosca 
Law they were kept by men. Afterwards, we checked 
whether the presence of women allows influencing 
the company's profitability and whether there is the 
presence of foreign women for companies with more 
than three women. In all cases, we have compared 
the variables detected with the ROE. 
Table 4 contains the correlation analysis of the 
examined variables compared with the ROE. 
 
Table 4. Correlation between women, WP, WED, WNED, WNEID and ROE 
 
 WOMEN WP WED WNED WNEID ROE 
WOMEN 1.0000      
WP -0.1530 1.0000     
WED -0.1581 0.2862 1.0000    
WNED 0.1324 0.1267 -0.1086 1.0000   
WNEID 0.3240 0.0349 -0.2714 0.2399 1.0000  
ROE 0.1089 -0.0102 -0.1726 0.0570 0.0509 1.0000 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Table 4 shows a positive correlation between 
the number of women and the ROE for a value of 
0.1089. This result confirms the studies conducted 
by some in doctrine (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 
2003; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003, Carter, 
D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2008; Conyon & He, 
2017) on a group of large U.S. companies. From their 
analysis, it can be seen that a greater gender balance 
between the members of the board of directors is 
associated with higher share values and greater 
profitability. On the contrary, the correlation 
between the women who assume the role of 
president and the ROE is negative, probably because 
the women in the sample who assume the role of 
president are few and this does not allow to 
influence profitability, the same goes for women 
who they assume the role of executive directors 
where there is a correlation index with a value of -
0.1726. Otherwise, if women take on the role of non-
executive directors, the correlation index is positive 
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with a value of 0.0509 just as it is positive even 
when they take on the role of 
non-executive and independent directors. This 
confirms what was stated in the doctrine and cited 
above, namely that women mainly occupy 
non-executive and independent roles, precisely 
because unlike men they are unable to conquer top 
positions within the BoDs thus often obtaining 
marginal positions. Furthermore, within the BoDs, 
women who take on the role of non-executive and 
independent administrators are often, in number not 
less than three. This indicates a greater probability 
of being heard and asserting one's decisions and 
consequently the possibility of positively influencing 
profitability. Probably, if the study conducted with 
our sample had been projected on a sample of 
a family-run company, the results would not have 
been different. In fact, in family businesses women 
manage to reach the leading positions by taking 
longer than men to reach the top positions, however, 
once the summit is reached the results are seen 
because women are the bearers of change, creativity 
and independence; they denote patience, they prefer 
order and coordination in critical business processes 
(Di Bello, 2019). 
Table 5, on the other hand, allows us to verify 
how foreign women manage to influence corporate 
profitability. 
 
Table 5. Correlation between foreign women and 
ROE 
 
 WFOREIGN ROE 
WFOREIGN 1.0000  
ROE 0.1632 1.0000 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
To carry out the analysis of the correlation 
between the number of foreign women and the ROE, 
we went to select the companies that in our sample 
had more than three women and then we went to 
identify those companies that had foreign women in 
the BoD. From our sample, there are only five 
companies with this characteristic: Telecom, Edison, 
Atlantia, Autogrill and Molmed. There is a positive 
influence of foreign women on corporate 
profitability in fact the correlation index is equal to 
0.1632. The ability to have a company run by foreign 
members, who have managerial experience, 
knowledge and specialist skills appropriate to the 
company's legitimate role in the eyes of 
stakeholders and shareholders. 
It should be emphasized that the presence of 
foreigners in the BoDs in Italy is very low and the 
percentage of foreigners is lower than in more 
similar countries such as Spain and Germany, 
confirming the fact that Italy has not yet achieved 




The work confirms what has been said in the 
doctrine and that is that women who occupy 
marginal positions on the boards positively 
influence company performance. When they assume 
the role of presidents and executive administrators, 
the correlation becomes negative. This could result 
from the fact that they have to prove more to be 
considered valid and are mistaken for more junior 
figures than they actually are (McKinsey & Company, 
2019). It is important that women are present to 
a greater extent, it would be necessary to have at 
least three women on the boards of directors to 
make them heard, at least three women are needed 
to change the way the board is managed (Egon 
Zehnder, 2018). The analysis for the three-year 
period confirms a greater female presence in the 
boards even if only in non-top positions. This could 
be the reason why the women in the sample failed to 
positively influence performance. The evidence that 
emerged from the work should be interpreted taking 
into account the limitations deriving from the use of 
a limited sample of companies, which in the future 
we intend to extend to all the companies listed on 
the Milan Stock Exchange, also considering 
an extension of the analysis to the current time 
period (the years 2019 and 2020). In fact, when the 
discipline of the Golfo-Mosca Law is no longer in 
force, we propose to check whether the companies 
will continue to believe that having more women 
within the boards is a source of competitive 
advantage; only in that case will it be possible to 
verify whether the Golfo-Mosca Law has succeeded 
in its objective, namely to generate cultural change 
in companies. Furthermore, again for the future, one 
could think of evaluating the differences between 
the companies operating in the various Italian 
regions to understand the reasons that originate 
them and therefore reach more objective global 
results. In addition, it could also be verified for each 
company whether the female directors are such by 
virtue of a kinship bond with the property or 
because of their personal qualities that have allowed 
them to be chosen among competitors belonging 
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